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Profitt: RICO Conspiracy

COMMENT
RICO CONSPIRACY: THE NINTH
CIRCUIT DISTINGUISHES ITSELF
FROM THE RISING COSTS OF
GUILTY THOUGHTS
INTRODUCTION

In July of 2002, minority partners of the Montreal Expos
filed charges against Major League Baseball commissioner Bud
Selig.! The suit seeks $100 million in punitive damages and
unspecified compensatory damages. 2 Surprising to most, the
suit is not based on claims arising from disputes over labor,
salary caps or rules and regulations. Rather, the plaintiffs
claim that Selig and his co-defendants actively plotted to
eliminate baseball in Montreal. Their cause of action is based
on the Racketeering and Corrupt Organization Act.
The Racketeering and Corrupt Organization Act,
commonly referred to by its acronym, RICO, was enacted over
thirty years ago, in 1970. 3 The statute is part of the Organized
Crime Control Act, which, as the title suggests, sought "the
eradication of organized crime in the United States."4 While
the Organized Crime Control Act created RICO to "combat the
infiltration into and corruption of America's legitimate
business community by organized crime," it is only occasionally
put to these ends in civil cases today.5 In fact, despite its
legislative intent, "RICO has become one of the most free1 BMO Nesbitt Burns et al. v. Loria et al., No. 1:02cv22061 (S.D. Fla. Filed July 16,
2002), available at http://news.fmdlaw.comlhdocs/docs/sports!bmoexpos71602cmp.pdf.

2

Id.

Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CML RICO: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE 3 (American Bar
Association) (2000).
5 Id. at 3.
3

4

47
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wielding clubs of our time."6 As a result, RICO suits like that
against Selig are increasingly common. For this reason, some
commentators have concluded that RICO "is very possibly the
single worst piece of legislation on the books."7
Part I of this Comment briefly surveys the legislative
development of the RICO statute. S It discusses the elements of
a RICO cause of action and disputes that have arisen among
the circuit courts over its interpretation. 9 Part II of this
Comment examines the development of civil liability for
conspiring to participate in a RICO enterprise.1° It focuses on
cases that have significantly shaped civil RICO conspiracy
liability throughout the circuit courts. Part III explores the
split that has developed among the circuits over the definition
of RICO conspiracy liability, specifically, the difference
between the Ninth Circuit's definition and that of the
majority.ll This discussion also considers the Congressional
intent that shaped the RICO statute, policy aims of the statute
and implications arising from the different standards of
liability.
I. BACKGROUND

The RICO statute can be found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68. 12
Section 1964{c) of the statute creates the civil RICO cause of
action, which states, in pertinent part, "Any person injured in
his business or property by reason of a violation of § 1962 ...
may sue therefore . . . and shall recover threefold the damages
he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee ..."13 This single sentence has led to a flood of
litigation. 14 Originally, the statute limited civil remedies to
6
Lawrence Morahan, Use of Racketeer Statute to Sue Catholic Church Draws Fire,
CNSNews.com at
http://www.cnsnews.comlNationlArchive/200203INAT20020325b.html
7 Second Thoughts on RICO, WALL ST. J., REVIEW & OUTLOOK (Editorial), May 19,
1989.
B See infra notes 12-35 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 12-35 and accompanying text.
to See infra notes 36-128 and accompanying text.
11
See infra notes 129-150 and accompanying text.
12 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § I, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
13 Gregory P. Joseph, Civil Rico Conspiracy, available at
http://www.josephnyc.com/article_11.htm.
14 JOSEPH, supra note 4, at 1.
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injunctive actions brought by the United States. Just before
the statute's enactment, however, Congress added a civil
remedy not confined to governmental plaintiffs. 15 As a result,
RICO has become a formidable weapon for plaintiffs in civil
litigation. 16
One primary factor driving RICO suits is the lucrative
damages it awards. Although the original RICO bill that
passed the Senate did not include treble damages to those
injured by racketeering activities, this clause was added to give
those "wronged by organized crime access to a legal remedy."17
The bill's Senate sponsor stated that the treble damages would
be "a major new tool in extirpating the baneful influence of
Another factor
organized crime in our economic life."18
contributing to the increase of RICO suits is the broad
language of the statute. Even though the bill's express purpose
was to wipe out organized crime in the United States, the
statute does not specifically identify organized crime as a
target. This is partly due to the difficulty of defining organized
crime and, partly, because of the belief that requiring proof
that a defendant falls within such a definition would thwart
efforts to achieve the remedial objectives of the law. 19
Accordingly, the legislature drafted the statute in general
terms to allow for flexible application. 20
RICO suits have also increased because of broader
interpretations of liability under the statute. During the past
decade, several important holdings have lowered the threshold
that successful plaintiffs must meet. Consequently, the use of
RICO has spread to a range of scenarios well beyond organized
crime.
A ELEMENTS OF A RICO CAUSE OF ACTION

Typically, civil liability resulting from a substantive
violation of RICO requires the defendant to engage in a
"pattern of racketeering activity." "Racketeering activity" is
15

Id. at 2·3.

Frederick B. Lacey, Civil RICO Update, SE99 ALI·ABA 301, at 304 (2000).
William H. Rehnquist, Get RICO Out of My Courtroom, WALL ST. J., May 19,
1989, at A14.
16
17

18

19
20

Id.
Id.
Id.
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defined as the commission of any number of state and federal
offenses enumerated in Section 1961(1), such as: mail fraud,
wire fraud, drug trafficking, murder, arson, gambling, bribery,
extortion, or embezzlement. 21 At least one of these offenses
must be committed through a pattern to sustain a RICO claim.
These acts are called "predicate acts" of racketeering. 22 A
"pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two related
acts of racketeering activity within a ten-year period. 23
A showing of racketeering activity alone, however, will not
support a plaintiffs suit.
A civil RICO plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant committed the racketeering
activity in connection with the affairs of an "enterprise"
engaged in or affecting interstate commerce in a manner that
violates one of the four subsections of Section 1962.24 An
"enterprise" is any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated-in-fact, although not a legal entity.25
Traditionally, the enterprise requirement is broadly
interpreted and requires a common purpose and "some
structure ... but there need not be much."26
There are three substantive violations and one conspiracy
violation under RICO.27 Accordingly, a person can violate
RICO by:
(1) Investment: Under Section 1962(a), it is unlawful to
invest any income derived from a pattern of racketeering
activity (or through collection of an unlawful debt) to acquire
any interest in, or to establish or operate, any enterprise that is
engaged in or affects interstate of foreign commerce.
(2) . Acquisition: Under Section 1962(b), it is unlawful to
acquire or maintain any interest in, or control of, any
enterprise that is engaged or in or affects interstate or foreign
commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of an unlawful debt.

21
22
23
24

25
26
27

Lacey, supra note 12, at 304 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962).
Id. at 304.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(5».
Id. at 304.
Id. at 305 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1961(4».
Id. at 305 (quoting Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1379 (7th Cir. 1992».
Id. at 304.
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(3) Participation: Under Section 1962(c), it is unlawful for
any person to conduct or participate in the conduct of the
affairs of an enterprise that is engaged in or affects interstate
or foreign commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity
or· collection of an unlawful debt. 28
The fourth type of violation under RICO Section 1962 is
conspiracy to commit a substantive RICO offense. 29
Consequently, one violates the RICO statute when he conspires
to commit a substantive RICO offense. 3o
B. INTERPRETIVE DISPUTES AMONG THE CIRCUITS
The United States Supreme Court has addressed several
issues that have grown out of disputes over interpretive
differences of the RICO statute, although only a handful of
these issues were addressed in the first years after RICO's
enactment. In fact, for years after its enactment, civil RICO
had little effect on organized crime or racketeering within
organizations because few civil suits were filed. 31 Then, in the
1980's, the number of civil suits filed under the statute
flourished because of coverage afforded to civil RICO actions by
the national media, legal publications and continuing legal
education programs. 32 Private plaintiffs awoke to the lucrative
treble damages available under civil RICO and the number of
civil RICO cases filed in federal courts rapidly multiplied. 33 As
a result, federal courts are burdened with traditional state
court actions, like divorce, trespass, professional malpractice,
inheritance disputes, employment benefits, and sexual
harassment, which have been recast as RICO claims. 34
One area of interpretive dispute that plagues the RICO
statute, and that places the Ninth Circuit at odds with the
Joseph, supra note 14, at 1·2.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
30 Yvette M. Mastin, RICO Conspiracy: Dismantles the Mexican Mafia & Disables
Procedural Due Process, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2295, 2309 (2001), (quoting 18
U.S.C. 1962(a·d».
31 Id. at
2312 (quoting Douglas E. Abrams, Crime Legislation and the Public
Interest: Lessons from Civil RICO, 50 SMU L. REV. 33, 51 (1996».
32 Id. at 2312 (quoting Robert E. Wood, Civil RICO-Limitations in Limbo, 21
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 683, 684 (1985); William H. Rehnquist, Get RICO Out of My
Courtroom, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1989, at AI4).
33 Rehnquist, supra note 4, at A14.
34 Id.
28

29
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majority of circuits, is RICO's "conspiracy" provision, Section
1962(d). At issue is its interplay with RICO's "participation"
provision, Section 1962(c).
Alleged violations of RICO's
participation provision are the basis of most civil actions under
RICO.35
The split among the circuits regarding a defendant's
liability for conspiring to participate in a RICO enterprise
stems from two key issues. The first issue is the level of
participation a defendant must have in the RICO enterprise.
The second is what standard of conspiracy governs the civil
RICO statute, general conspiracy law or civil conspiracy law.
To better understand the circuits' split over the interpretation
of liability under RICO's conspiracy section, the next section
reviews pertinent decisions that have shaped RICO conspiracy
law.

II. CASE HISTORY
A. THE REVES DECISION
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young. 36 At issue in Reves was
whether a defendant must participate in the operation or
management of the RICO enterprise to be liable under the
RICO participation provision. The participation provision
makes it illegal "for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity ... "37
In this case, the plaintiffs, purchasers of demand notes
from a farmer's cooperative, brought securities fraud and RICO
participation actions against the cooperative's accountants. 38
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant accounting firm

35 Lee Applebaum, Case Law May Open Door for RICO Plaintiffs: Statute Could
Allow Avoidance of Reves Test, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 15, 2001, available at
WL 3/15/2001 TLI 5.
36 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
37 Id. at 172 (quoting U.S.C. §§ 1962(c».
38 Id. at 176.
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prepared annual financial audits that knowingly overvalued
the principal asset of the cooperative. 39
In its analysis, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument
that the word "conduct" in Section 1962(c) should be read as
"carryon," stating that if this were the interpretation, then
"any involvement in the affairs of an enterprise would satisfy
the 'conduct or participate' requirement."40 Conversely, the
Court agreed with the defendant and found that the word
"conduct" requires some degree of direction, and "participate"
requires some part in that direction. 41 Thus, the Court held
that to conduct, or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of an enterprise's affairs, a <;lefendant must participate
in the operation or management of the enterprise. 42 Therefore,
"[a] person cannot be liable under section 1962(c) unless he or
she participated in the operation or management of the alleged
RICO enterprise."43 This standard of liability is commonly
referred to as the Reves "operation or management" test.44
Based on this reasoning, the Court found that the defendant's
actions in Reves - preparing the cooperative's financial
statements - did not give rise to liability under the
participation provision. 45

B. THE ANTAR DECISION
Although Reves clarified the level of participation a
defendant must embrace in a RICO enterprise to be liable for
violating the RICO participation provision, its holding defined
the initial contours of a split between the federal courts over

Id.
Id. at 179.
41
Id.
42 Id. at 185
43 Id at 176. In deciding Reves, the Court relied on the "operation or management
test" articulated in Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364. In that case, former and
present residents of a retirement community alleged that the defendants participated,
and conspired to participate, in a pattern of racketeering through mail fraud. In
reviewing the plaintiffs complaint, the court stated that mere participation in the
predicate offenses listed in RICO, even in conjunction with a RICO enterprise, may be
insufficient to support a RICO cause of action. Rather, a defendant's participation
must be in the conduct of the affairs of a RICO enterprise, which ordinarily will require
some participation in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.
44 Reves, at 186.
45 Id.
39

40
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the applicability of its operation or management test with
regard to the RICO conspiracy provision.
In 1995, the Third Circuit faced two criminal defendants
charged with conspiring to participate in a RICO enterprise,
based on predicate acts of securities fraud, mail fraud and
falsification of financial statements. 46 In United States v.
Antar, one defendant argued that since he "opted-out" of the
conspiracy some five years prior to the RICO conspiracy
charge, he could not be guilty of violating the participation
provision under the Reves operation or management test. 47 In
addition, he claimed that since he could not be guilty of
violating the participation provision, he could not alternatively
be guilty for conspiring to violate that same provision. 48 The
defendant asserted that "courts risk eviscerating Reves by
blanketly approving conspiracy convictions when substantive
convictions under section 1962(c) are unavailable."49 Indeed,
one commentator remarked that "if Congress' restriction of
section 1962(c) liability to those who operate or manage the
enterprise can be avoided simply by alleging that a defendant
aided and abetted or conspired with someone who operated or
managed the enterprise, then Reves would be rendered almost
nugatory."50
While the Antar court acknowledged that this argument
could have merit if Reves were interpreted broadly, it crafted a
distinction:
[W]e believe that a distinction can be drawn between, on the
one hand, conspiring to operate or manage an enterprise, and,
on the other, conspiring with someone who is operating or
managing the enterprise. Liability would be permissible
under the first scenario, but, without more, not under the
second. 51

The court reasoned that in the first scenario, the defendant
is conspiring to do something for which, if successful, he would

United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 572 (3rd Cir. 1995).
Id. at 580.
48 Id.
49 Id at 581.
50 Id., quoting David B. Smith & Terrance G. Reed, Civil RICO, § 5.04 at 5·39
(1994).
51 Antar, 53 F.3d at 581.
46

47
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be liable under the substantive participation provision;
whereas in the second, the defendant is not conspiring to do
something for which he could be liable under that same
substantive provision. 52
Therefore, the court held that
conspiracy liability cannot stand unless a defendant conspires
to operate or manage a RICO enterprise. 53 Aside from this
reasoning, the court found that Reves and its policies did not
conflict with the conspiracy charge because the defendant in
Antar did not properly withdraw from the conspiracy. Thus,
the court refused to dismiss the conspiracy charge. 54
Effectively, this holding mapped the participation
requirements of Section 1962(c) onto Section 1962(d). It
required that a RICO plaintiff establish all of the participation
elements to make a claim for conspiring to participate in a
RICO enterprise. 55 This holding is based on the reasoning that
it would not make sense to exclude a class of people from a
participation violation, only to make those same people liable
for conspiring to violate that section. 56 The court did not want
RICO's conspiracy section to find a person liable for conspiring
to commit an act that was impossible for that person to
substantively commit. 57 The Antar court wanted to ensure that
defendants were not held liable for substantive RICO violations
through the statute's back-door conspiracy provision when
substantive-provision violations could not be proven; thus, the
court sought to close the door that Reves left open. As a result,
the Antar holding left the Third Circuit at odds with the
Eleventh, Second, Seventh -- and later on the Fifth -- Circuits,
which hold that the Reves operation or management test does
not apply to Section 1962(d) convictions. 58 In these circuits,
judicial interpretation concludes that since Reves did not
specifically address Section 1962(d), it has no influence over

54

Id.
Id.
Id. at 58l.

55

Applebaum, supra note 35.

52
53

56
57

Id.
Id.

58 Neibel v. Transworld Assurance Co., 108 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing
United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443, 1452 (11th Cir. 1996) cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1118 (1997».
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conspiracy claims, even if the conspiracy is to violate Section
1962(c).59

C. THE NEIBEL DECISION
In March of 1997, the Ninth Circuit recognized the existing
split between the circuits regarding whether the Reves
operation or management test applies to Section 1962(d) claims
based on allegations of conspiracy to violate RICO's
participation provision. It chose to follow the Third Circuit's
holding in Antar, concluding that the Reves test applies to
conspiracy claims where the object of the conspiracy is to
violate RICO through participating in a RICO enterprise. 60
In
Neibel v. Transworld Assurance Company, the
defendant insurance company appealed a district court
judgment where it was found liable for conspiracy under
RICO.61 In this case, the defendant argued that there was
insufficient evidence for the jury to find that it violated Section
1962(d).62 The appellate court, finding that "the Third Circuit's
opinion in Antar best comports with our post-Reves case law,"
held that in order to "participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs," one must have some part
in directing those affairs. 63 Concluding that the jury properly
found the defendant's activities supported an agreement to
have sqme part in directing the enterprise's affairs, the court
held that the plaintiffs' conspiracy claim was valid. 64
The defendant in Neibel further argued that the district
court's directed verdict on the RICO participation claim
prevented the plaintiffs from succeeding on the conspiracy
The appellate court found, however, that the
claim. 65
defendant inaccurately relied on an interpretation of an earlier
Ninth Circuit case in its argument. 66 In that earlier case,
Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, the court held that
since the plaintiff "failed to allege the requisite substantive
59

JOSEPH, supra note 4, at 127.

60

Westways World Travel v. AMR Corp, 182 F. Supp. 2d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2001).
Neibel, 108 F.3d at 1122.
Id. at 1128.
Id.
Id. at 1129.
Id. at 1127.
Id. at 1128.

61

62

63
64

65
6Il
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elements of RICO, the conspiracy cause of action cannot
stand."67 The Neibel court specified that what the court meant
in Wollersheim was that if the participation claim does not
state a cause of action upon which relief could ever be granted,
regardless of evidence, then the conspiracy claim cannot
stand. 68 Clarifying this holding, the court stated that "[a] lack
of evidence may render the substantive claim deficient, but it
does not render it legally impossible."69 In such situations,
therefore, a conspiracy claim may proceed to the jury despite a
directed verdict on participation claims. 70 Consequently, the
court rejected the defendant's argument. 71
Accordingly, Neibel defines the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of conspiracy to violate RICO's participation
provision as "an agreement to conduct or participate in the
affairs of an enterprise and an agreement to the commission of
at least two predicate acts."72 In addition, it graphs the Reves
operation or management test onto its definition so that there
must be substantial evidence that the defendant agreed to have
some part in directing the RICO enterprise. 73
D. THE SALINAS DECISION

In 1997, the Supreme Court handed down another
important decision that furthered the conflict among the
circuit courts regarding RICO conspiracy law. Prior to Salinas
v. United States, the circuits were split as to whether the
agreement to commit the predicate acts must be an agreement
on the part of the defendant personally to commit two acts of
racketeering activity.74 In this criminal case, the plaintiff was
charged with participation and conspiracy violations. 75 At
trial, a jury acquitted the defendant of the participation count
67 Neibel, 108 F.3d at 1127 (citing Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 971
F.2d 364, 367 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1992».
68 [d.
69 [d.
70 [d.
71 [d.
72 [d. at 1128 (citing Baumer v. Pachl, 8 F.3d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1993), (quoting
United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 499 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
939,940).
73 [d at 1128.
74 Salinas v. United States, 52 U.S. 61 (1997).
75 [d. at 55
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because he had not personally committed that Section's
requisite minimum two predicate acts, but it convicted him of
the conspiracy count.76 The Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's decision and reasoned that even if the plaintiff did not
accept or agree to commit the predicate acts (in this case,
accepting bribes) personally, there was ample evidence that his
co-conspirator committed at least two predicate acts and that
the plaintiff knew about and agreed to facilitate the scheme. 77
The Supreme Court concluded that such knowledge and intent
is sufficient to support the defendant's conspiracy conviction. 78
Accordingly, the Court held that a defendant need not
personally commit two predicate acts to be liable for
conspiracy.79 It asserted that general conspiracy law governs
Section 1962(d) and consequently, a conspiracy may exist even
if a conspirator does not agree to commit or facilitate each
substantive offense. 8o Therefore, conspirators are liable for the
acts of their co-conspirators when each agrees to pursue the
same criminal objective. 81
While the Salinas holding resolved the conflict among the
circuits regarding whether a defendant must personally
commit two predicate acts to be liable for RICO conspiracy, its
broad wording furthered the confusion among the circuits
concerning the standard to use in determining conspiracy
liability under RICO. In its holding, the Salinas court said to
be liable for conspiring to participate in a RICO enterprise, "a
conspirator must intend to further an endeavor which, if
completed, would satisfy all of the elements a substantive
offense, but it suffices that he adopt the goal of furthering or
facilitating the criminal endeavor."82
In consequence, a
conspirator may violate RICO's participation provision in any
number of ways short of agreeing to undertake all of the acts
necessary for the crime's completion. 83 Moreover, the Court
explained that, "[a] person may be liable for conspiracy even
though he was incapable of committing the substantive
76

77
78

79

80
8!
82

83

Id at 63.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id at 65.
Id at 63.
Id.
Id at 65.
Id.
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offence."84 Therefore, conspiracy liability may attach without
the need to prove that a defendant committed an overt act.
Since this 1997 verdict, federal courts have continually
struggled with Salinas and its application to civil RICO
conspiracy claims. 85 The resulting decisions are perplexing and
uncertain. 86 The holding has strained the circuits' attempts to
reconcile the scope of Reves operation or management test, that
test's applicability to Section 1962(d) and the level of
knowledge and participation an alleged conspirator must
embrace. What specifically, then, is required to conspire to
violate the substantive provisions of the RICO statute? The
Supreme Court has yet to address this question.

E. THE BROUWER DECISION
In January of 2000, "at the risk of splitting hairs that are
already split," the Seventh Circuit sought to reconcile Salinas
and Reves and explain whether a party must agree to
personally participate in the operation, management, or
conduct of the RICO enterprise for a conspiracy violation to
exist under Section 1962(d).B7 In Brouwer v. Raffensperger, the
plaintiffs alleged that both an underwriting firm and a law
firm conspired to violate the RICO statute through a Ponzi
scheme created to raise capital and simultaneously conceal the
undercapitalized condition of the bankrupt issuer.88 The
plaintiffs argued that pursuant to Salinas, the general law of
conspiracy applies to Section 1962(d) and, therefore, it is wrong
to require personal participation in the conduct of the affairs of
the RICO enterprise. 89 Based on this reasoning, the plaintiffs
also argued that, under a RICO conspiracy claim, if it is
sufficient that a conspirator agree that someone else commit
the predicate acts, then it should also be sufficient that a
84

Id. at 64.

Dean Browning Webb & John Clinton Geil, Judicial Implausability: Beck
Severely Restricts Salinas in Civil RICO Conspiracy Litigation, 16 No. 10 Andrews Civ.
85

RICO Litig. Rep. 13 (June 2000), available at WL 16 No. 10 ANCRLR 13.
86

Id.

Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co, 199 f.3d 961, 967 (7th Cir. 2000). The
court's full statement says: At the risk of splitting hairs that are already split, we will
attempt to make sense out of all of this, reconcile Salinas and Reves, and explain the
kind of personal participation we hold is necessary to violate subsection (d). Id. at 967.
88 Id. at 963.
89 Id. at 964.
87
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conspirator agree that someone else should conduct the affairs
of the RICO enterprise. 90
In considering the plaintiffs' arguments, the appellate
court acknowledged that it has consistently required some
degree of personal participation for a defendant to be liable for
conspiring to violate the participation provision. 91 Rather than
abandon this principle of personal participation, and rather
than adhere to the higher standard of participation spelled out
by the Supreme Court in Reves, the Seventh Circuit
compromised. It held that "one does not need to agree
personally to be an operator or manager. One must knowingly
agree to perform services of a kind which facilitate the
activities of those who are operating the enterprise in an illegal
manner."92 The Brouwer court found that it is an agreement,
not to operate or manage the enterprise, but to facilitate
personally the activities of those who do that stipulates liability
for RICO conspiracy.93
Agreeing with the plaintiffs that, per Salinas, general
conspiracy law applies to Section 1962(d), the court found that
it is not necessary that a defendant personally participate in
the operation or management of the enterprise. 94 The court
cautioned, however, "this is not a bright line, that district
judges will have to evaluate whether what a defendant agreed
to do is sufficient to bring his conduct within subsection (d)."95
In their writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, petitioners
argued that the application of the Reves operation and
management test to RICO conspiracy claims is a recurring
issue on which the circuits are in conflict.96 The Supreme
Court, however, declined to review this ruling. 97

Id.
Id. at 965.
92 Id. at 967.
93 Id ..at 967.
94 Id. at 965·67.
95 Id. at 967.
96 Supreme Court Denies Review of RICO Conspiracy Ruling, 16 No. 10 Andrews
Civ. RICO Litig. Rep.3 (June 2000), available at WL 16 No. 10 ANCRLR 3.
97 Brouwer, 530 U.S. 1243 (2000), cert. denied.
90
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F. THE BECK DECISION
Three years after Salinas and four months after the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Brouwer, the Supreme Court
again sought to resolve a split between the circuits regarding
the interpretation of civil RICO. In Beck v. Prupis, the
Supreme Court decided the issue of whether a person injured
by an overt act done in furtherance of a RICO conspiracy has a
cause of action if the overt act is not an act of racketeering. 98
Beck is a whistle-blower case that involved a chief
executive officer who was terminated after alerting regulators
to the activities of his colleagues. He asserted that the
company's officers and directors were engaged in racketeering
activity and orchestrated his removal to further their illegal
activities. 99 The defendants argued that employees who are
terminated for refusing to participate in RICO activities, or
who threaten to report RICO activities, do not have standing to
sue under RICO for damages from their loss of employment. lOO
The district court and the court of appeals agreed with the
defendants' argument and the Supreme Court affirmed both
lower courts' holdings. The Supreme Court concluded that
relief arising from a RICO conspiracy' claim must be
proximately attributable to the commission of an overt act
specifically identified by the RICO statute. l01 Any overt act not
statutorily listed under RICO precludes the required standing
to advance such a claim.l02
In its analysis, the Supreme Court relied on the effect of
combining Sections 1964(c) and 1962(d) of RICO, so that
together the provisions provide a civil cause of action for
conspiracy. 103 Where Section 1964(c) creates a cause of action
available to anyone "injured ... by reason of a violation of
section 1962," Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful for a person
"to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a),
(b), or (c) of this section."!04 "To define what it means to be

103

Beck v. Pupis, 529 U.S. 494, 496 (2000).
Id. at 498-99.
Id. at 499.
Id.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 500 n.6.

104

[d. at 500.
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100
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injured ... by reason of a conspiracy," the Supreme Court relied
on the common law definition of civil conspiracy.1 05
In Beck, the Supreme Court looked to numerous holdings
to support its finding and concluded, that:
[t]here is no civil action for conspiracy alone. It must be
coupled with the commission of acts that damaged the
plaintiff. Recovery may be had from parties on the theory of
concerted action as long as the elements of the separate and
actionable tort are properly proved. lOG

The Court further stated the principle that "a civil
conspiracy plaintiff must claim injury from an act of a tortious
character was so widely accepted at the time of RICO's
adoption as to be incorporated in the common understanding of
civil conspiracy."I07 Thus, it concluded, Congress must have
intended the cause of action to rest on the common law
principles of civil conspiracy.1 08
Therefore, while the Beck decision clarifies that a civil
plaintiff does not have standing under RICO for an Injury
caused by a non-racketeering act, it fuels the confusion
regarding the interpretation of RICO's conspiracy provision.
Some practitioners argue that this holding is at direct odds
with the Supreme Court's previous holding in Salinas.10 9
There, the Court concluded that general conspiracy law
governs Section 1962(d) and that an overt act is not necessary
for a RICO conspiracy conviction, rather, it is only necessary to
show that a conspirator intended to facilitate or further the
criminal endeavor.l1o Although Salinas is a criminal RICO
case and Beck is a civil suit, the Beck Court notes in Beck that
Salinas neither repudiates its holding regarding what
constitutes a conspiracy violation nor indicates that the
violation is different in a civil context.l l1 How then, can Beck
be reconciled with Salinas? The Third Circuit circumvented
this question in Smith u. Berg. 112

111

Id. at 50l.
Id. at 1615 (citing Halbertstam v. Welsch, 705 F.2d 472 (C.A.D.C. 1983».
Id. at 504.
Id.
Supreme Court Denies Review of RICO Conspiracy Ruling, supra note 97.
Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63.
Beck, 529 U.S. at 500 n.6.

112

Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532 (3rd Cir. 2001).
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G. THE SMITH DECISION
The same circuit that authored the Antar holding in 1995
again faced the issue of civil RICO conspiracy liability in July
of 2000. On the heels of the Supreme Court's decision in Beck,
a Third Circuit district court issued its holding in Smith u.
Berg and immediately certified its holding for appeal. l13 In
April of 2001, a three-judge federal appeals panel unanimously
affirmed the district court's holding.1 14
In Smith, the plaintiffs alleged. that one of the defendants,
John G. Berg, misled them into purchasing homes they could
not afford through fraudulent assertions.l15 The plaintiffs
further alleged that the other defendants, title insurance and
lending companies, conspired with Berg to further his
fraudulent enterprise by allowing him to assume many of his
co-defendants' normal functions during the course of the
transactions.l16 The defendants, on the other hand, argued
that the plaintiffs' claims failed because the defendants'
conduct did not demonstrate that they managed or operated, or
agreed to manage or operate, Berg's enterprise and therefore,
they did not violate the RICO participation provision.1 17 The
defendants based this argument on the Third Circuit's earlier
ruling in Antar, where it found that a defendant must conspire
to operate or manage a RICO enterprise to be liable under
Section 1962(d).1 18
The court rejected the defendants'
argument in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Salinas.
In short, the court found that Salinas "implicitly overruled
our prior holding in United States u. Antar, and that, in
accordance with Salinas, liability under Section 1962(d) is met
by knowledge of the corrupt enterprise's activities and
agreement to facilitate those activities."l19 It held that a
defendant need not operate or manage a RICO enterprise to be
liable under Section 1962(d).120 The court further stated that
the distinction it crafted in Antar between conspiring to
113

11.
115
116
117
118
119

120

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 536.
at 539.
at 534.
at 539.
at 538.
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operate or manage an enterprise versus conspiring with
someone who operates or manages the enterprise, was likewise
unnecessary to the Antar holding because in that case, the
defendant met both standards. 121
Furthermore, the court noted that the majority of other
circuits have not applied the Reves operation or management
test to RICO conspiracy claims. It agreed with the majority of
circuits that Reves addressed only the extent of conduct or
participation necessary to violate the participation provision of
the statute and that it did not address the principles of
conspiracy law comprising Section 1962(d).122
Therefore, the Third Circuit reconsidered the standard of
conspiracy liability it crafted in Antar and held that "any
reading of Antar suggesting a stricter standard of liability
under section 1962(d) is inconsistent with the broad application
of general conspi~acy law set forth in Salinas."123 It stated that
pursuant to general conspiracy law, a defendant may be held
liable for conspiracy to violate the participation provision if he
knowingly agrees to facilitate a scheme that includes the
operation or management of a RICO enterprise. 124
Accordingly, the Smith court interpreted Salinas as
broadening the scope of RICO conspiracy and implicitly
rejected the limits it suggested earlier in Antar.1 25 "The plain
implication of the standard set forth in Salinas is that one who
opts into or participates in a conspiracy is liable for the acts of
his coconspirators which violate the participation prOVlSIOn
even if the defendant did not personally agree to do, or to
conspire with respect to, any particular element."126
Taking into consideration the impact of Beck on the issues
in Smith, the district court concluded, "Beck did not affect the
plaintiffs' claims in this case because they, unlike Beck, allege
direct injury as a result of the racketeering."127 Utilizing this

Id. at 536.
Id. (quoting United States v. Quintalnilla, 2 F.3d 1469, 1484-85 (7th Cir. 1993».
123 Smith, 247 F.3d at 538.
124
Id.
125 Shannon P. Duffy, Narrowing Antar, :Jrd Circuit Broadens Who Can Be
'Conspirator' in Rico Suit, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 18, 2001, available at WL
121

122

4/18/2001 TLI 1.
126
127

Id.
Smith, 247 F.3d at 536.
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distinction, the Third Circuit avoided the issue of reconciling
the Beck and Salinas decisions.

III.

DISCUSSION

Despite these Supreme Court and circuit court decisions,
questions surrounding what is required to conspire to violate
the RICO participation provision still linger. Specifically, the
issues of whether conspiracy liability requires a defendant to
conspire to operate or manage the RICO enterprise and
whether that same liability requires an overt act in furtherance
of the conspiracy remain.
Current Ninth Circuit law mandates that to be civilly
liable for conspiring to violate the RICO participation
provision, a defendant must (1) agree to participate in the
affairs of the RICO enterprise; (2) agree to the commission of at
least two predicates acts; and (3) participate in the operation or
management of the enterprise. 128 This interpretation of the
statute conflicts with the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh129
and after Smith, the Third130 Circuits' interpretation of the
statute. The split stems from interpretive differences between
the circuits' readings of Salinas in relation to Reves and
Salinas in relation to Beck.

A.

APPLICABILITY OF THE REVES OPERATION OR MANAGEMENT
TEST

The Ninth Circuit requires a RICO plaintiff to show
substantial evidence indicating that a defendant of a RICO
conspiracy suit operated or managed (or agreed to operate or
manage) a RICO enterprise. Otherwise, as the Seventh Circuit
aptly states in Brouwer, "it seems wrong that a person could
conspire to violate a law which does not apply to him."131 Yet,
this is exactly what the Seventh and other circuits permit by
not requiring that conspiracy defendants meet the Reves
operation or management test.

128
129

130
131

Westways World Travel, v. AMR Corp., 182 F.Supp.2d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2001).
Baker v. Stewart Title & Trust of Phoenix, Inc., 5 P.3d 249,258 n. 6 (2000).
Smith, 247 F.3d at 539.
Brouwer, 199 F.3d at 966.
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In particular, the Third and Seventh Circuits rely on the
Supreme Court's opinion in Salinas as grounds for not
mandating defendants charged with conspiring to violate the
participation provision to have operated or managed the RICO
enterprise. This reliance, however, is misplaced. In Smith and
Brouwer, Third and Seventh Circuit cases respectively, the
courts reject the premise that the Reves operation or
management test applies not only to Section 1962(c) of RICO,
but also to Section 1962(d).
In Smith, the court reasons that because the Salinas court
expresses its analysis of RICO's conspiracy section in broad
terms, that "any reading of Antar suggesting a stricter
standard of liability under section 1962(d) is inconsistent ..
."132 Thus, the Smith court concludes that "[i]n accord with the
general principles of criminal conspiracy law, a defendant may
be held liable for conspiracy to violate section 1962(c) if he
knowingly agrees to facilitate ... a RICO enterprise."133
In Brouwer, the court correctly concludes that Reves holds
defendants liable under Section 1962(c) when they participate
in the conduct of the enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity.134 Based on this conclusion, it crafts a
special relationship between the RICO enterprise and the
conspiracy to run it. 135 The court postulates that an agreement
to join a conspiracy is highly personal and similarly, an
agreement to participate in the conduct of an enterprise is
personal. But, it concludes, actually getting the job done is not
necessarily personal.1 36 For that reason, the Brouwer court
interprets the Salinas holding as requiring an analysis of the
"level of personal participation" the defendant shared in the
enterprise rather than whether the defendant participated in
its operation or management. 137
Both of these courts' decisions are misguided in as much as
they strive to reconcile the Supreme Court's holding in Salinas
with Reves. In these two cases, the courts were determining
the liability of defendants, who, like the defendant in Reves,
132

133
134
135
136

137

Smith, 247 F.3d at 538.
Id. at 538.
Brouwer, 199 F.3d at 966.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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were "outside" of the enterprise. That is, these defendants
were not "employed by or associated with" the RICO enterprise
and accordingly, they did not meet the operation or
management test. 138
At issue in Salinas, contrary to Reves, is the liability of a
defendant "inside" of the RICO enterprise. In Salinas, the
court properly held that an "insider" defendant, whose actions
are essential to the success of the enterprise, and who
knowingly implements decisions of the enterprise's
management and thus enables the enterprise to achieve its
goals, can be found liable under RICO's conspiracy section
independent of the Reves operation or management test.
Salinas, in fact, portrays a typical scenario of organized crime
that the statute aims to combat. The Supreme Court's
unanimous opinion that the defendant in Salinas was guilty of
conspiring to violate RICO supports this contention.
It is, therefore, the inherent differences between Reves and
Salinas, the former being a civil action concerning "outsider"
liability and the latter a criminal case dealing with a
racketeering enterprise "insider," that run afoul the circuit
The result of these
courts' attempts to reconcile them.
attempts is an overly-broad interpretation of the RICO
conspiracy provision that does not support the intent of the
statute or the policy it reflects.
In Reves, the Supreme Court defined the intent of the
RICO participation provision as a means to find liability in
defendants who conduct or participate in a RICO enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.139 There, the
Court concluded that this section is properly interpreted to
mean that only defendants who operate or manage the
enterprise can be liable for violating it.140 To make this point,
the Court distinguishes the conspiracy provision from Sections
1962(a) and (b), the investment and acquisition provisions.
The Court maintains that these provisions were constructed
specifically to address the liability attributable to defendants

138 See Reves, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993). The Court holds that to be "associated with"
a RICO enterprise, a defendant must participate in the operation or management of
that enterprise. Id. at 185.
139 Reves, 507 U.S. at 185.
140 Id.
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"outsider" of the enterprise.1 41 Section 1962(d), on the other
hand, was targeted specifically at defendants operating within
the organization. 142
Consequently, if a defendant of a conspiracy to participate
in a RICO enterprise is not held to the same standard as a
defendant accused of participating in a racketeering enterprise,
then the Court's holding in Reves would be meaningless. Thus,
even though the Supreme Court has not modified or reversed
Reves, the majority's interpretation of Section 1962(d)
effectively eviscerates it and allows every failed participation
claim to be recast as a conspiracy claim. The Ninth Circuit
does not. Accordingly, its interpretation concurs with the
Supreme Court's.
B. NECESSITY OF AN OVERT ACT
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Salinas,
several circuit courts relaxed their standards of liability in
claims for conspiring to violate RICO through racketeering
activity. Not only did the majority of circuits disregard the
application of the Reves operation or management test to
conspiracy claims, but they also abandoned the civil conspiracy
law principle that a conspirator agree to commit, or agree that
another conspirator should commit, an overt act in furtherance
of the conspiracy. Instead, these circuits merely require that
conspirators share a common purpose.
In Smith, the Third Circuit analyzed the Supreme Court's
opinion in Salinas and determined that for conspiracy liability
to attach, it is only necessary that defendant conspirators
knowingly agree to facilitate the RICO enterprise. 143 Although
the district court in Smith requested briefing from the parties
on the import of the Supreme Court's decision in Beck, it
concluded that Beck did not affect the plaintiffs claims because
the Smith plaintiffs, unlike the Beck plaintiff, alleged direct
injury as a result of racketeering. 144 The Smith appellate court
also concluded that the Beck holding did not vitiate the Smith
plaintiffs' claims because it found that Beck did not alter the

143

Id.
Id.
Smith, 247 F.3d at 537.

144

Id. at 536.

141
142

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol33/iss1/4

22

Profitt: RICO Conspiracy

2003]

RICO CONSPIRACY

69

standard for determining liability under RICO's conspiracy
section that the Supreme Court defined in Salinas. 145 In
considering the significance of Beck in Smith, however, the
Third Circuit misinterpreted the Supreme Court's reasoning
and, consequently, it misconstrued the standard to which RICO
conspiracy defendants should be held.
In footnote 6 of Beck, the Court plainly states that the
common law of criminal conspiracy defines what constitutes a
violation of RICO Section 1962(d) in criminal cases. 146 "We
have turned to the common law of criminal conspiracy to define
what constitutes a violation of § 1962(d), see Salinas."147 When
the issue, however, is what constitutes a civil cause of action
for private injury by reason of such a violation, the Court says
"[t]he obvious source in the common law ... is the law of civil
conspiracy."148
Using civil conspiracy law to construe the requisite acts of
a civil RICO conspiracy violation comports with the principles
of civil law that were widely accepted at the time RICO was
enacted. Those principles declare that there must be an act of
tortious character to carry "[t]he mere common plan, design or
even express agreement . . . into execution."149 Further,
because inchoate crimes are difficult to conceptualize under
civil law, it follows that a conspiracy cannot be made the
subject of a civil action without a concomitant tortious act, the
damage from which a plaintiff can seek damages. Therefore, it
is appropriate to distinguish between civil and criminal claims.
Whereas the purpose of a civil claim is to impute liability for a
specific injury, the purpose of a criminal claim is to redress the
harm to society that a conspiracy as such represents. 150 The
more convincing reading of the RICO conspiracy provision,
then, mandates that an overt act (of racketeering) be
committed in furtherance of the enterprise. The Ninth Circuit
enforces this interpretation.

145
146
147
148
149

150

Id. at 538·39.
Beck, 529 U.S. at 501 n.6.
Id.
Id.
[d. at 501.
JOSEPH, supra note 4, at 128.
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CONCLUSION

Due to recent judicial holdings, the majority of circuit
courts have allowed the net of liability for conspiring to
participate in a RICO enterprise to expand. As a result, court
dockets are becoming increasingly crowded and plaintiffs are
reworking their traditional state court causes of action so that
they may enjoy the lucrative returns of a successful RICO
claim. More disturbing however, is the strong likelihood that
defendants in these circuits will be found liable under the
statute "through association" or for "conspiring to conspire." In
either case, the majority's interpretation of the RICO
conspiracy provision hands plaintiffs a powerful tool. It
enables them to infringe upon RICO defendants' First
Amendment right of freedom of association and lets them
punish RICO defendants for guilty thoughts. Conversely, the
Ninth Circuit's reading of RICO guards defendants against
unjust RICO claims and prevents the statute from being
employed beyond its intent and purpose. It is this trend, after
all, that has led practitioners to conclude "RICO is very
possibly the single worst piece of legislation on the books."151
Thus, even though the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
RICO statute is at odds with the majority of circuits', Supreme
Court precedent, civil conspiracy law and legislative intent
each advocate that confining liability to conspiring to operate
or manage the enterprise makes sense. In conclusion, the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of RICO's conspiracy provision is
the more persuasive.
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